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Abstract. The safety problem for the complex system is regarded as a control problem other than 
probability one, where the overall functional control structure model of the complex system could 
be configured in terms of the relationships among their functional labels. The hazards are due to 
the unsafe control actions (UCA), or the malfunctional control action (MCA). Meanwhile, UCA 
and MCA are due to the error feedback information (EFI), the error environment variables (EEV), 
the error state variables (ESE), the error command inputs (ECI), the error working modes (EWM), 
and the error process models (EPM), etc. Every function or component would be described as 10 
labels, which are the input command (IC), the feedback to the upper level (FU), the control action 
(CA), the feedback from the lower levels (FL), the external input command (EC), the process 
model (PM), other related state variable (SV), the precondition (PC), the resource and the 
executing condition (RE) of the system, and the environment variable (EV). The aircraft wheel 
brake system’s control structure model is given to show its effectiveness. 
Keywords: functional control structure model, system safety analysis, wheel brake system. 
1. Introduction 
Accidents are becoming more and more complicated with the development of complex system 
and their causes might be the interaction among components and the various external factors of 
the operating condition and environment, except from the faults of the components.  
In the view of system engineering [1], accidents are caused by the interaction among various 
functions or components resulting from the unsafe control action due to uncertain factors, such as 
time, model, resource and information. In the view of control engineering [2], the unsafe control 
actions resulting in accidents could be explained by models and information relationship, such as 
inadequacy models, varying environment, insufficient precondition and incomplete information, 
and can be regarded as the loss of control due to the oversize disturbance or unknown uncertainty. 
Thus, analyzing the system safety associated with modeling and control could be an effective way 
and might be extended to the quantitative analysis, such as system simulation [3, 4]. Recently, 
many researchers have use new accident models to consider the safety for the complex system. 
Nancy proposed STAMP and STPA [5, 6] and widely applied into the safety analysis for many 
complex systems [7-9]. 
Nancy’s results are based on the Functional Control Structure Model (FCSM), but she did not 
provide the way to establish FCSM for any complex system. Only some simple feedback loop was 
discussed [5, 6]. Moreover, STAMP and SPTA are qualitative. In fact, the obtained FCSM could 
be used to system safety’s quantitative analysis only if the models and data obtained from the 
detailed designing information could be used to establish the system safety’s quantitative 
analyzing circumstances, especially in safety simulation [3, 4]. Furthermore, STAMP and STPA 
without functional labels are very different from the FRAM [10] with functional labels such that 
they are usually ‘think of what you do’ and less of systematicness and completeness. Totally, 
STAMP/STPA might be an effective way to handle these complex systems’ safety, but many lacks 
should be notified as follows. 
1) STAMP/STPA is a procedure other than a method. The formal description of any function 
is not perfectly defined to identify the unsafe control action. It is very necessary to propose an 
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effective way in methodology to configure the functional control structure model for the complex 
system.  
2) STAMP/STPA is modeled qualitatively without mathematic model such that the functional 
control structure and its properties could not be verified, and the unsafe control actions and 
malfunctional control actions could not be identified directly by the dynamic analysis and the 
system simulation. 
3) STAMP/STPA does not use the state space to describe its variables such that the 
configuration of the functional control structure model is chaotic in the process of identifying the 
unsafe control action. It is very necessary to build STAMP/STPA in systemic programmer with 
the state spaces variables. 
In this paper, FCSM would be established using functional labels such that the system’s safety 
analysis could be performed by analyzing the properties for the particular labels’ direction, starting 
points and end points. FCSM for system safety analysis is configured to identify the unsafe control 
action and malfunctional control action. The model might be used qualitatively or quantitatively 
such that it is not only a method, but also a program for the safety analysis of the complex system. 
2. A formal description of the function or component (FDFC)  
As shown in [10], the function may be defined for the specified function or components as ‘the 
specified task of the specified function or component is finished by someone or automation under 
the specified conditions and within the specified time’.  
The labels used in FRAM [10] could be re-considered to propose FDFC in the view of system 
safety such that they could describe the typical control structure relationship and are convenient 
for the system safety analysis.  
Firstly, it is necessary for system safety analysis to describe the function or component’s 
specified task within the specified time and under the specified condition. The specified task not 
only generates the control action necessary to the lower levels and the feedback to the upper levels, 
but also receives the associated information from the other functions or the related systems. The 
specified time is required to provide the proper control action, feedback and any other inputs or 
outputs timely (without delay, too soon, too long or out of sequence) and to stop providing timely 
(without delay, too soon, too late or out of sequence). The model has considered the limited 
conditions other than all possible conditions, so the specified conditions are required to ensure the 
effectiveness of the model and an effective model should be reconfigured under the specified 
operation conditions.  
Meanwhile, every function or component has its inputs, outputs, preconditions, necessary 
resource and executing conditions. One function or component’s inputs might be its input 
commands from the upper levels, the external control commands from the related systems which 
might be conflicted with each other, the feedbacks from the lower levels, the environment 
variables from the related systems which might affect its properties, the related state variables 
which is used to specify its process model. One function or component’s outputs might be its 
control actions to the lower levels and the feedbacks to the upper levels. One function or 
component’s precondition is the necessarily existed condition before its execution, which might 
be the outputs and logical compositions of the other functions or components. One function or 
component’s resource is the necessarily existing powers or materials in its execution, which might 
be controlled by the other systems. 
Simply, it is clear that there are five factors in relation with 10 labels must be considered for a 
function or component, i.e. its input, output, precondition, resource and model, as shown in 
Fig. 1(a). Meanwhile, as shown in Fig. 1(b), a function or component should be labeled with 10 
labels, named as Input Command (IC), Feedback to the Upper level (FU), Control Action(CA), 
Feedback from the Lower level (FL), External input Command (EC), Precondition (PC), other 
related State Variable (SV), Environment Variable (EV), Resource and Executing condition (RE), 
and Process Model (PM), respectively. The labels and their meanings associated to the relative 
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factors are shown in table 1. 
 
a) FDFC with 5 factors 
PM
Function or component’s name
FL
FUIC
CA
EC
PC,RE
EV
SV
 
b) FDFC with 10 labels 
Fig. 1. FDFC’s 10 labels and 5 factors 
Table 1. The labels, meaning and factors 
No. Name Label Meaning Factors 
1 Input command IC The command to the specified function or component Input 
2 External input command EC 
The control commands from the other channels,  
which might conflict with IC Input 
3 Feedback from the lower level FL 
Feedback from the lower levels to the specified 
function or component Input 
4 Environment variable EV 
Variables describing the operating environment of the 
specified function or component Input 
5 Other related state variable SV 
The related state variables used by the function or 
component process model Input 
6 Control action CA Control action generated by the function or component to control the lower levels Output 
7 Feedback to the upper level FU 
The feedback from the function or component to the 
upper level Output 
8 Process model PM The process model used to generate CA and FU Model 
9 Precondition PC The necessary preconditions for a function or component PC 
10 Resource and executing condition RE 
The necessary resource and executing conditions for 
the specified function or component RE 
3. Functional control structure model (FCSM) of the system 
Ordinarily, any system consists of various functions or components, and its FCSM could be 
configured by connecting various FDFC’s labels and considering the relationship among systems 
and environment conditions. Firstly, ICs, CAs, FUs, FLs and ECs connect each other from one 
FDFC to another according to their directions defined by the system working principle. Secondly, 
SVs are used by the system and generated by the other systems. Thirdly, EVs are used by the 
system and given by the operation environment. Lastly, PC and RE are the precondition or 
resource of the function under the specified SVs and EVs.  
The method of establishing FCSM from multiple FDFC is very similar to not only that of 
drawing the plan and control chart [11], but also that of drawing program flow chart [12]. Here, 
FCSM’s constitution, rules and steps should be considered comprehensively. 
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Firstly, FCSM is consist of FDFCs, directional lines and signal marking variables. The 
relationship among functions or components can be described clearly by FCSM, while the 
time-sequence relationship and the related interaction would be appeared in various FDFC’s 
models. The directional lines are used to connect the labels of various FDFC according to the 
system working principle. Every line has its specific starting point and multiple end points. For 
example, CA and IC can be connected each other with the direction line CA→IC, while FU and 
FL can be connected each other with the direction line FU→FL. The signal’s marking variables 
are used to declare the signal’s name within the directional line. The signals may be the inputs, 
outputs, preconditions, executing conditions and resources of the specified functions or 
components. 
Secondly, the steps in generating FCSM from FDFCs are shown as Fig. 2 and contain four 
stages. Stage 1: Decompose the system into various functions or components, which has its inputs, 
outputs, resources, preconditions and models, and complies with its working principles. Stage 2: 
For every function or component, list its labels and form the functional detailed lists with their 
name, type, label and direction as Table 2. Stage 3: From the upper functions or components to 
the lower ones, connect various functions or components to form FCSM according to their labels 
and functional detailed lists. Stage 4: Check the obtained lists and modify the FCSM as shown in 
Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. FCSM’s general steps 
Fig. 3 shows the FCSM of the aircraft wheel brake system [13]. The system consists of 4 
functions or components, named as FC (Flight Crew), BSCU (Brake System Control Unit), 
WBSH (WBS Hydraulics) and Wheels. It is a logic system because its inputs, outputs and process 
models are mainly logic ones. It is complex because it is not only an integrated system of electrics, 
mechanics and hydraulics, but also a man-machine interaction system. Its FCSM could be 
obtained from the lists as shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. The variables of the aircraft wheel brake system 
No Name Label Variable Directions 
1 FC 
CA 
Brake (pedal) FC→BSCU FC→WBSH 
BSCU power on/off FC→BSCU 
Arm and set disarm FC→BSCU 
PC Normal/Alternate braking mode WBSH→FC 
FL 
Fault detected BSCU→FC 
Activated status BSCU→FC 
Armed status BSCU→FC 
Programmed deceleration rate BSCU→FC 
SV 
Flight phase (landing, TRO, Taxi, takeoff) A/C→FC 
Status of other brake mechanism A/C→FC 
A/C ground speed A/C→FC 
EV Runway length Weather Statues of runway (wet or icy) Weather 
2 BSCU 
CA 
Open/close green shutoff valve BSCU→WBSH 
Green meter valve position command BSCU→WBSH 
Open/close blue anti-skid valve BSCU→WBSH 
IC 
Brake (pedal) FC→BSCU 
BSCU power on/off FC→BSCU 
Arm and set/disarm for autobrake FC→BSCU 
FU 
Fault detected BSCU→FC 
Activated status BSCU→FC 
Armed status BSCU→FC 
Programmed deceleration rate BSCU→FC 
FL Wheel speed Wheel→BSCU 
SV Autobrake triggers (touchdown, RTO) A/C→BSCU 
3 WBSH 
IC 
Brake (pedal)-manual brake FC→WBSU 
Open/close green shutoff valve BSCU→WBSH 
Green meter valve position command BSCU→WBSH 
Open/close blue anti-skid valve BSCU→WBSH 
CA Braking force WBSH→Wheels 
PC Preconditions WBSH→CREW 
4 Aircraft physical system 
IC Braking force WBSH→Wheels 
FU Wheel speed Wheels→BSCU 
As shown in Table 2, any FU of one function or component will have a corresponding FL of 
the other function or component, and some CA of one function or component will have IC of the 
other function or component. Meanwhile, in Fig. 3, M1 is the model of flight crew, such as 
‘Autobrake Armed/Not Armed’. M2 is the model of BSCU, such as ‘Valve command’. M3 is the 
model of WBSH, such as ‘Alternate/Normal mode switch’. M4 is the model of Aircraft Physical 
System, such as ‘A/C speed’. EV is the environment variables of the flight crew, such as ‘Runway 
length’. SV1 is the related state variables of the flight crew, such as ‘Flight status’. SV2 is the 
related state variables of BSCU, such as ‘Touchdown’. PC is the working mode of WBS, such as 
‘Normal braking mode’. CA1 is the control action from flight crew to BSCU, such as ‘BSCU 
on/off’. CA2 is the control action from BSCU to WBSH, such as ‘Open/close green shutoff valve’. 
CA3 is the control action from WBSH to the wheel, such as ‘Braking force’. F1 is the feedback 
from BSCU to flight crew, such as ‘Armed status’. F2 is the feedback from Aircraft Physical 
System to BSCU, such as ‘Wheel speed’. 
In similar way, FCSM could be obtained from any complex system. Fig. 4 is some – type 
89. FUNCTIONAL CONTROL STRUCTURE MODEL FOR THE COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND ITS APPLICATION IN SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS.  
JIANBO HU, LEI ZHENG 
 © JVE INTERNATIONAL LTD. ISSN PRINT 2335-2124, ISSN ONLINE 2424-4635, KAUNAS, LITHUANIA 75 
Aircraft Flying Control System (AFCS) [14], which is composed of Flight Crew(FC), Automatic 
Control System (ACS), Fly by Wire (FBW), FBW Hydraulics(FBWH), Control Surface (CS), 
Monitor Indicators (MI), Monitors and Controllers (MC), Fling Meters (FM), Aircraft Motion 
Sensors (AMS) and Aircraft. It is a mixed system because its inputs, outputs and process models 
are mixed ones, such as logical events, motions’ dynamics and faults’ detecting. It is complex 
because it is not only an integrated system with multi-redundant electrics, mechanics and 
hydraulics, but also a man-machine interaction system with multi-various modes. 
There are three modes to control aircraft’s motion. In ACS mode, ACS receives the automatic 
control commands from flight crew and sends the control action to FBW resulting in control action 
passed to FBWH, while FBWH generates the control action to CS resulting in aircraft motions. 
The specific automatic control mode should be defined by MC. It must receive the feedback 
signals from AMS. It is noted that ACS mode has its specified preconditions about flight status, 
altitudes and speeds. In FBW mode, FBW receives the stick displacement electrical signal from 
flight crew and sends control action to FBWH to control CS resulting in aircraft motions. FBW is 
multi-redundant channels and must be monitored and controlled correctly by MC to obtain the 
proper working channel. It must receive the feedback signals from AMS. It is noted that FBW 
mode must be switch to the Manual mode if there is fatal fault in FBW, such as two FBW channels 
are successive malfunctional. In Manual mode, CS directly received the stick displacement 
mechanical control action from flight crew resulting in aircraft motion.  
 
Fig. 3. The CSM of the aircraft wheel brake system Fig. 4. The FCSM of the aircraft flying control system 
4. Hazards and factors 
Accident is caused by one of hazards and one accident may be caused by one of many hazards. 
One hazard may be caused by the composition of the above 10 labels for some functions or 
components. Every label has a start point and an end point. The information on this label’s end 
point or starting point should be provided or stop timely, in order and effectively. For the 
convenient of system safety analysis, five Classes of factors are named by “Control Action”, 
“Feedback”, “Variable”, “Aided Control” and “Model”, respectively. 
Firstly, for the control action, the necessary control action must be provided when it is necessary 
and stopped when it is not necessary, and should be provided and stopped timely. If not, it is an 
unsafe control action (UCA) and might cause hazards. As shown in Table 3, UCA might be caused 
in four cases. Meanwhile, the provided control action must be followed or executed. If not, it is a 
malfunctional control action (MCA) and might cause hazards. As shown in Table 3, the 
malfunctional control action might be caused by the other four cases. MCA means that the control 
action was provided but not followed or executed. UCA and MCA are regarded as Class “Control 
Action”. 
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Table 3. Classes, error and causes 
No Classes Error or unsafe Types Causes 
1 Control action 
UCA (4) 
Provided when it is 
no necessary (PNN) 
The control action is provided when there is a 
contradiction at the current condition 
Not provided when it 
is necessary (NPN) 
The control action is not provided when there is 
necessary at the current condition 
Provided too late, too 
soon or out of 
sequence (PLSS) 
The control action is provided too late, too soon 
and out of sequence, resulting in the unexpected 
conditions 
Stopped too soon, 
applied too long 
(SSAL) 
The control action is stopped too soon or 
applied too long, resulting in the unexpected 
conditions 
MCA (4) 
Conflict with EC 
(CEC) The specified control conflicts with EC 
Inadequate PC (IPC) The control action cannot execute in the specified PC 
Out of CA’s capacity 
(OCC) 
Under the current condition, the control action’s 
capacity is not enough to finish IC 
Out of the lower 
model’s variation 
(OMV) 
The control action’s requirement does not assign 
with the scope of the controlled model’s 
variation 
2 Feedback EFU (5) EFL (5) 
Not provided when it 
is necessary (NPN) 
The feedback information is not provided 
(providing) when it is necessary 
Provided but 
incorrect (PBI) 
The feedback information is provided 
(providing) but incorrect 
Measured 
(measuring) but 
inaccurate (MBI) 
The feedback information is measured 
(measuring) but inaccurate such that the 
feedback information conflict with the other 
variables to trigger the working mode and to 
announce improperly 
Provided (providing) 
but too late or too 
soon (PLS) 
The feedback information is provided 
(providing) but too late to sample correctly or too 
soon to sample timely 
Provided (providing) 
but missing (PMI) 
The feedback information is missing, such as 
digital information 
3 Variables 
EEV (5) 
Not provided when it 
is necessary (NPN) 
The environment variables from the related 
systems are not provided when it is necessary 
Provided but 
incorrect (PBI) 
The environment variables from the related 
systems are provided but incorrect 
Measured 
(measuring) but 
inaccurate (MBI) 
The environment variables from the related 
systems are measured but inaccurate such that 
the providing environment variables conflict 
with the other variables to trigger the working 
mode and to announce improperly 
Provided (providing) 
but too late or too 
soon (PLS) 
The environment variables from the related 
systems are provided but too late to sample 
correctly or too soon to sample timely 
Provided (providing) 
but missing (PMI) 
The feedback information is missing, such as 
digital information 
ESV (5) 
Not provided when it 
is necessary (NPN) 
The state variables from the total system are not 
provided when it is necessary 
Provided but 
incorrect (PBI) 
The state variables from the total system are 
provided but incorrect 
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Measured 
(measuring) but 
inaccurate (MBI) 
The state variables from the total system are 
measured but inaccurate such that the providing 
state variables conflict with the other variables to 
trigger the working mode and to announce 
improperly 
Provided (providing) 
but too late or too 
soon (PLS) 
The state variables from the total system are 
provided but too late to sample correctly or too 
soon to sample timely 
Provided (providing) 
but missing (PMI) 
The feedback information is missing, such as 
digital information 
4 Aided control 
EEC (4) 
Provided when it is 
no necessary (PNN) 
The external control action is provided when 
there is a contradiction with CA 
Not provided when it 
is necessary (NPN) 
The external control action is not provided when 
it is necessary at the current condition 
Provided too late, too 
soon or out of 
sequence (PLSS) 
The external control action is provided too late, 
too soon and out of sequence, resulting in the 
unexpected conditions 
Stopped too soon, 
applied too long 
(SSAL) 
The external control action is stopped too soon 
or applied too long, resulting in. the unexpected 
conditions 
EPC (4) 
Provided when it is 
no necessary (PNN) 
The precondition is provided when there is a 
contradiction with CA’s requirement 
Not provided when it 
is necessary (NPN) 
The precondition is not provided when it is 
necessary for the current CA 
Provided too late, too 
soon or out of 
sequence (PLSS) 
The precondition is provided too late, too soon 
and out of sequence, resulting in the loss of CA 
Stopped too soon, 
applied too long 
(SSAL) 
The precondition is stopped too soon or applied 
too long, resulting in the loss of CA 
ECI (4) 
Provided when it is 
no necessary (PNN) 
The command inputs are provided when there is 
a contradiction at the current conditions 
Not provided when it 
is necessary (NPN) 
The command inputs are not provided when it is 
necessary for the current conditions 
Provided too early, 
too late, too soon or 
out of sequence 
(PELSS) 
The command inputs are provided too early, too 
late, too soon and out of sequence, resulting in 
the loss of control 
Stopped too soon, 
applied too long 
(SSAL) 
The command inputs are stopped too soon or 
applied too long, resulting in the loss of control 
ERE (2) 
Not provided when it 
is necessary (NPN) 
The RE is not provided continuously when it is 
necessary for the current conditions 
Provided but lower in 
the capacity (PLC) 
The RE is provided but its capacity is lower than 
the required one 
5 Model EPM (3) 
Model inconsistent 
(MICS) 
The chosen model cannot meet the actual 
condition, resulting from the errors of the 
environment variables, the related state variables 
and the working mode 
Model incorrect 
(MICR) 
The model is incorrect such that the model 
cannot work properly 
Model incomplete 
(MICM) 
The model is incomplete such that there is not a 
proper model under the specified conditions 
Secondly, for the feedback information, the necessary one from the uppers (EFU) must be 
provided timely, accurately and correctly. If not, it is an error feedback information and might 
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cause hazards. As shown in Table 3, EFU might be caused in five cases. Meanwhile, the necessary 
feedback to the lowers (EFL) must be provided adequately without missing and delay. If not, it is 
a malfunctional feedback information and might cause hazards. As shown in Table 3, EFL might 
be caused by the other five cases. EFU and EFL are regarded as Class “Feedback”. 
Thirdly, for environment variables, the necessary environment variables from the other system 
must be provided timely, correctly and completely. If not, it is an error environment variable  
(EEV) and might cause hazards. As shown in Table 3, EEV might be caused in five cases. 
Meanwhile, the necessary state variables from the total system must be provided timely, correctly 
and completely. If not, it is an error state variable (ESV) and might cause hazards. As shown in 
Table 2, ESV might be caused by the other five cases. EEV and ESV are regarded as Class 
“Variable”. 
Fourthly, for ex-control action, the necessary external control action must be provided when it 
is necessary and stopped when it is not necessary, and should be provided and stopped timely. If 
not, it is an error external control(EEC) action and might cause hazards. As shown in Table 3, 
EEC might be caused in four cases. Meanwhile, the necessary preconditions must be provided 
when it is necessary and stopped when it is not necessary, and should be provided and stopped 
timely. If not, it is an error precondition (EPC) and might cause hazards. As shown in Table 3, 
EPC might be caused by the other four cases. Furthermore, the necessary command input must be 
provided when it is necessary and stopped when it is not necessary, and should be provided and 
stopped timely. If not, it is an error command input (ECI) and might cause hazards. As shown in 
Table 3, ECI might be caused by the other four cases. Finally, the necessary resource and 
executing condition for a function or component must be provided when it is necessary, and should 
be provided effectively and continuously. If not, it is an error resource and executing condition 
(ERE) and might cause hazards. As shown in Table 3, ERE might be caused by the other two 
cases. EEC, EPC, ECI and ERE are regarded as Class “Aided Control”. 
Fifthly, in the model factors, the process model should consider the predicted uncertainty and 
various disturbances, sufficiently. If not, it is an error process model (EPM) and might cause 
hazards. As shown in Table 3, EPM might be caused by three cases.  
5. Function-Hazards tree and its qualitative analysis for safety 
Obviously, the hazards resulting from the types of Table 3 might be shown in Fig. 5, it is very 
like ‘Fault-tree’ in the traditional safety analysis, named as Function-Hazard-Tree (FHT), and can 
be used qualitatively to analysis safety. From FHT, the compositions of EFIs, MFIs, EEVs, ESVs, 
EECs, ECIs, EPCs and EPMs, resulting from the designing errors, requirement flaws, software 
error, interaction among other control action or various failures, can generate UCA and MCA. 
For the particular system, its FCSM can be built up by the methods given in the Section 3. For 
example, Fig. 6 shows the FCSM of the aircraft wheel brake system. Meanwhile, in order to 
analyze the cause of UCA and MCA, FCSM for the specified behavior (flight crew or Autobrake, 
in this example), which is consist of five factors as shown in Fig. 5, must be considered. The five 
factors in Fig. 6 are given in Table 4. Furthermore, UCA and MCA can be discovered qualitatively 
according to the possible compositions as shown in Table 5. 
It is noted that quantitative analysis for the safety would implement easily based on FCSM and 
FHT. Firstly, UCA and MCA resulting from the FHT and its qualitative analysis might be used to 
determine the design requirement to eliminate or mitigated the influence of UCA and MCA. 
Secondly, some non-identifying new UCA and MCA would be discovered quantitatively by 
considering the possible compositions of EFIs, MFIs, EEVs, ESVs, EECs, ECIs, EREs, EPCs, 
and EPMs from FCSM. Lastly, Quantitative analysis for every UCA and MCA might be useful to 
discover EFIs, MFIs, EEVs, ESVs, EECs, ECIs, EREs, EPCs, and EPMs as completely as  
possible. 
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Hazards
Com
positions
Control Action
Accident
 
Fig. 5. Function Hazards tree 
Table 4. Classes in Fig. 6 
No. Classes Contents 
1 Control action Manual brake command 
2 Aided-control Normal/Alternate braking mode 
3 Feedback 
Autobrake activated status 
Autobrake armed status 
Autobrake deceleration rate 
Fault detected 
4 Variables 
Flight status 
Actual deceleration rate 
Wheel speed 
Runway length 
Other brake mechanisms’ status 
5 Model 
Auto-brake Armed/Not armed 
Auto-brake deceleration rate 
Auto-brake activation status 
WBS Normal/Alternate braking mode 
BSCU power on/off 
Manual provided/Not provided 
Flight status (touchdown, rejected takeoff, taxi, etc.) 
Aircraft status (speed, deceleration rate, etc.) 
 
Fig. 6. The control process model of aircraft wheel brake system for flight crew 
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Table 5. Hazards and factors 
H-1 Inadequate aircraft deceleration upon landing, rejected takeoff, or taxing 
H-2 Aircraft maneuvers out of safe regions 
No. Control Feedback Variable Ex-control Model Hazard 
1 Manual barking 
BSCU Fault 
detected Flight status Auto-brake BSCU fault/ no fault H-1, H-2 
UCA: Crew does not provide manual braking during landing when Auto-brake is not providing braking. 
Due to: 
EFL: Fault detect of BSCU is not provided during landing when BSCU is fault. 
ESV: Flight state is not provided during landing. 
EPM: The process model of BSCU fault/no fault is incorrect. 
2 Manual braking 
The feeling of 
the pedal 
pressure  
Flight status Auto-brake  BSCU fault/ no fault H-1, H-2 
UCA: Manual braking provided with insufficient pedal pressure, resulting in inadequate deceleration 
during landing. 
Due to: 
EFL: The feeling of the pedal pressure by pilots is not correct or too late. 
ESV: Flight state is not provided during landing. 
EPM: The process model of BSCU fault/no fault is incorrect. 
3 Manual braking touchdown Flight status Auto-brake 
Manual braking 
provided/ not 
provided 
H-1, H-2 
UCA: Manual braking applied before touchdown causes wheel lockup, loss of control, tire burst. 
Due to: 
EFL: The feeling of the pedal pressure by pilots is incorrect or too late. 
ESV: Flight state is incorrect. 
EPM: The process model of manual braking provided/ not provided is incorrect. 
4 Manual braking 
Taxi speed 
runway length Flight status Auto-brake A/C ground speed H-1, H-2 
UCA: Manual braking command is stopped before safe taxi speed is reached, resulting in over-speed or 
overshoot. 
Due to: 
EFL: The runway is too short or noted by pilots too late. 
ESV: Flight state is not provided during taxing 
EPM: The process model of A/C ground speed is incorrect. 
… … … … ... … … 
6. Conclusion 
The safety problem for the complex system is regarded as a control problem and the FCSM 
for the specified system was established in terms of its FDFCs. Based on the viewpoint that the 
hazards are due to UCA or MCA, a FHT is obtained from five classes “Control Action”, 
“Feedback”, “Variable”, “Aided Control” and “Model”. Control Action might be UCA and MCA, 
feedback might be EFU and EFL. Variable might be EEV, ESV. Aided-control might be EEC, 
ECI, EPC, ERE. Model might be three cases of EPM. The aircraft wheel brake system’s control 
structure model is given to show its effectiveness. 
Furthermore, the quantitative analysis should be researched. In fact, based on FCSM, we can 
obtain the designed simulation system for the particular system to establish the total FCSM with 
detailed mathematic model for every model, detailed signal properties for every connection label. 
Various error models should be established for every label’s starting point and end one. Next we 
will contribute an article for the quantitative analysis of the specified system. 
It is noted that Nancy’s research report [13, 15] indicated that STAMP/STPA might be instead 
of the analysis method suggested in SAE ARP 4761 [16] such that the analysis will be more 
general. Meanwhile, the requirements of FAA-AC25.1309 [17] are more covering, but there is no 
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effective way to check if the particular systems, equipment have been compliance with these 
requirements. Here, FCSM based on FDFCs could find more comprehensive safety requirement 
resulting in more safe system. 
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